Italy to the rescue
Reuters reported two days ago that Italy has agreed to provide a port to enable the safe transfer of Syria’s priority 1 chemicals from the Danish and Norwegian ships arriving from the Syrian port of Latakia to the US vessel Cape Ray for hydrolysis and neutralisation, most likely in international waters. Speculation about the proposed port arises now. Italian officials have thus far refused to identify it. According to the daily Corriere della Sera, as cited by The Voice of Russia, the chemicals will be kept in one of the Italian ports until the transfer to the Cape Ray. It …
Not so dead lines ‒ some updates and corrections
In my posting of 24 November Not so dead lines I tried to assess the composition of Syria’s chemical weapon (CW) arsenal based on official statements, the decision of 15 November by the Executive Council of the Organisaton for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the publication of the Request for Expression of Interest (EOI) inviting commercial companies to participate in the disposal of chemicals and resulting effluent. Given that several elements were based on conjecture, deduction and rough calculations, I offered them with caution pending confirmation. This post supplements, updates and corrects the previous entry. I have retained …
Sea-based destruction of Syria’s CW proposed
A few days ago the press revealed that the United States has offered to neutralise some of Syria’s most dangerous chemicals aboard the Maritime Administration vessel MV Cape Ray. In the margins of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) currently underway in The Hague, more details about the proposed neutralisation process have become available. At the time of writing, it appears that the US proposal is the only viable chemical weapon (CW) disposal method on the table. Although a decision on method of destruction for Priority 1 chemicals is not expected before 17 December …
Not so dead lines
If ever you had the impression that things had calmed down over the destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons (CW), you may be in for a bad surprise. The already frenzied pace of developments has just picked up again. On 15 November the OPCW decided on the timelines for the destruction and removal of Syria’s chemical weapon (CW) capacity. In parallel developments, countries that had been hoped to host the destruction operations kindly thanked the United States for the honour and politely refused. It basically left the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—aka the global community—with very few options: …
Syria's declared precursor chemicals
Nitrogen mustard Triethylamine 30 tonnes Monoisopropylamine 40 tonnes Mustard agents (general) 2-chloroethanol 5 tonnes V-agents Di-isopropyl aminoethanol 5 tonnes Sodium-o-ethyl methyl phosphonothionate 130 tonnes N (2-chloroethyl)-N-isopropyl propan 2 amine (salt) 40 tonnes N (2-chloroethyl)-N-isopropyl propan 2 amine (solution 23-64%) 90 tonnes N (2-chloroethyl)-N-ethyl propan 2 amine (solution 23-64%) 25 tonnes Sarin Propan-2-ol (= Isopropyl alcohol or isopropanol) 120 tonnes Hydrogen fluoride (used in the production of DF, a sarin precursor) 60 tonnes Hexamine 80 tonnes Nerve agents (general) Trimethyl phosphite 60 tonnes Dimethyl phosphite 5 tonnes Phosphorus pentasulfide 10 tonnes Phosphorus trichloride 30 tonnes Phosphorus oxychloride 15 tonnes Other chemicals …
Detailed calendar for the elimination of Syria's CW
2 December 2013 The Director-General is to report to the Executive Council on progress with the implementation of the decision of 15 November. 9 December 2013 The Technical Secretariat of the OPCW is to submit for consideration by the Executive Council the combined plans for the destruction and verification of the destruction of each declared Syrian CW production facility. 15 December 2013 Facilities with mobile units/systems designed for mixing and filling, and mixing and filling facilities where the specialised equipment is not yet dismantled, collocated with storage sites for binary components and/or empty munitions. 17 December 2013 Consideration by the …
The Military Implications of the Syrian Crisis: The Chemical Weapons Dimension
Joint Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Security and Defence (SEDE) Committee of the European Parliament Brussels, 26 September 2013 Statement (PDF) by Dr Jean Pascal Zanders 1. Mister Chairman, Members of the Foreign Affairs and Security and Defence Committees, I am honoured to address you today on the question of chemical weapons (CW) and disarmament in Syria. I understand that several of my recent writings on the subject have been made available to you as background information, and I will therefore limit myself to highlighting some key issues. 2. On 21 August, the world woke up …
Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons – Annotated commentary
This is a very quick reaction to the agreement between Russia and the United States to address Syria’s chemical weapons. My interpretations may change as more background information becomes available. I am sure that over the next few days there will be many background briefings to add texture to the individual paragraphs in the agreement. I welcome comments challenging or supplementing my views, and will revise this posting accordingly. Generally speaking, the bilateral agreement takes the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the fact that Syria has just submitted its instrument of accession to the UN Secretary General as the point …